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Abstract This paper studies the effects of a monetary union enlargement using the
techniques and outcomes from an extensive research project on macroeconomic
policy coordination in the EMU. Our approach is characterized by two main pillars:
(i) linear-quadratic differential games to capture externalities, spillovers and strategic
behaviour of (fiscal and monetary) players; and (ii) endogenous coalition formation
concepts which enable us to study a creation and stability of different cooperation
arrangements. In this paper we focus on the first pillar and construct a multi-player
linear-quadratic continuous-time model of 5 countries and 4 central banks to
evaluate effects of accession of a new member to an existing MU. Our findings
stress the importance of an asymmetric shock confirming basic results of the OCA
theory. It comes out that in our setting it is never profitable to enlarge the monetary
union when there is a risk of an asymmetric shock. What is more, the potential losses
from accession are so high that it can be barely possible to design a transfer system
to compensate for a worse situation of some countries.
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1 Introduction
The fourth enlargement of the European Union (EU) on the 1st of May 2004 was by
any standard the most pervasive and diverse of all EU-enlargements in history.1
Among many other obligations, new member states have also committed themselves
to join the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as soon as they have
fulfilled the entry conditions laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht. These so-called
Maastricht Criteria (EU, 1992, article 109 j (1)) provided fiscal convergence criteria
in terms of inflation, interest rates, debt and deficits for the countries to qualify for
entrance into the EMU.2 Depending on the amount of effort that countries invest in
complying with these entrance criteria there is a certain degree of freedom in
choosing the exact point in time at which to enter. In the fastest track e.g. countries
would comply immediately and enter the euro area in the second half of 2006. In
fact, Slovenia entered as the first new EU member state on the 1st of January 2007,
while Malta and (the Greek part of) Cyprus did so on the 1st of January 2008, and
Slovakia on the 1st of January 2009.3 Bohn (2004) rightly asserts regarding the
prospective acceding countries: “However, care must be taken to avoid recession or
overheating effects, in case interest and exchange rate impulses reinforce one another
(instead of exhibiting trade-off effects). The right timing for joining a monetary
union (MU henceforth) is crucial, if policymakers want to make sure that conditions
are advantageous for all countries involved.”
Moreover, it is very unlikely that a single strategy could be recommended to all
acceding countries regarding macroeconomic stabilization on the road to the euro.
Arguments in favor of adopting the euro as early as possible include a smaller
financial risk due to the elimination of a currency mismatch in the balance sheets of
banks and firms, interest rate convergence and overall gains in monetary credibility,
while arguments for a slower pace to the euro include the need to remove financial
distortions creating moral hazard and therefore raising the country’s default risk,
easier relative-price adjustment without the need of costly nominal wage and price
adjustments and the need to make fiscal and financial policy sustainable and
compatible with a fixed exchange rate before participation in the EMU. The
1 The earlier enlargements in 1981-86 and in 1995 involved only three countries each. The 2004 enlargement
raised the EU population to about 480 million people from 375 million in the EU-15 countries.
2 Hughes Hallett and McAdam (1997) and von Hagen and Lutz (1996) e.g. investigated the macroeconomic
repercussions of implementing the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty in the EMU-12.
3 According to the Maastricht Treaty a candidate country should participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II
(ERM II) without major tensions in the foreign exchange market. ERM II replaced the ERM of the European
Monetary System created in 1979. ERM II was established in 1997 with the resolution of the European Council
in order to link the currencies of the EU member states outside the euro area and the euro. Like ERM I, ERM II
is also a multilateral exchange rate arrangement with a fixed, but adjustable, central parity and a fluctuation band
around it. Countries participating in ERM II peg their exchange rates to the euro, allowing for fluctuations within
a symmetric band of 15 percent on each side of the central parity.
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European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo recommends in its 2004 Report on
the European Economy (p. 135) that: “Delaying participation in ERM II is a realistic
option for countries that are currently unable to sustain hard pegs and have large
domestic imbalances. The magnitude of domestic imbalances varies considerably across
countries, so that ERM entry may be desirable at different times. Yet in all cases, the
policy priority is achieving a sustainable fiscal situation and stabilizing inflation at the
correct relative prices, a task that requires both institutional and policy reforms.”
Several studies have analyzed the degree to which the accession countries may
form an OCA with the current euro area. In terms of trade interdependence and
business cycle convergence with the E(M)U, the accession countries reach
comparable scores like current member countries (see e.g. Boone and Maurel
(1999)). On the other hand, the degree of symmetry of shocks is generally found to
be lower (see e.g. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001)). The latter finding may be
problematic in the sense that the accession countries by acceding to the euro area
give up national monetary policy independence and in particular the possibility of
exchange rate adjustment vis-à-vis the euro area in case they experience asymmetric
shocks. Upon accession, their monetary policy will be set by the ECB. In addition,
the accession countries will adopt the fiscal policy cooperation and surveillance
procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact. During the recent years, monetary
policy in the accession countries have displayed a large variation ranging from very
strict euro pegging in the form of a currency board in small accession countries such
as Estonia to informal euro target zones in larger accession countries like Poland (see
European Parliament (1999) for a detailed account). As a consequence of fixed
bilateral exchange rates, asymmetric shocks have long been seen as the major
problem for the EMU (see Favero et al. (2000)). It is generally argued that this kind
of externalities can be coped by structural reforms that have been advocated to
improve flexibility on product and labor markets. However, an alternative way
resides in the adoption of coordinated policies among EU member countries.
This paper is based on the results from an extensive research project on macroeco-
nomic policy coordination in the presence of anMU.4 The detailed coverage of research
techniques and outcomes can be found in Plasmans et al. (2006) and on the internet.5
In this analysis we aim to shed some more light on issues of macroeconomic shocks in
the monetary area and the effects of its enlargement. To take into account spillovers,
externalities and strategic behaviour of different (self-oriented) players, we construct a
multi-country continuous-time model of 5 countries and 4 central banks. Moreover, we
solve the resulting differential game for some (the most plausible) coalition structures
in order to model effects of various cooperative arrangements between players.6 Such
arrangements, in pre- and post-accession stages, may have substantial impact on
profitability of accession. Finally, we compare the (optimal) losses caused by the same
4 This research project titled “Endogenous Coalition Formation in a European Stabilization Policy Setting:
Feasibility and Effects“ (University of Antwerp and Tilburg University) is financed by the Flemish
Science Foundation (FWO). Predecessors of the project are Engwerda et al. (1999, 2002).
5 See www.ua.ac.be/joseph.plasmans.
6 In this paper we restrict our attention to profitability of accession. We do not consider stability of
different coalition structures or other issues (e.g. institutional) of policy coordination. For an application of
endogenous coalition formation concepts in this setting see Plasmans et al. (2006), Michalak et al. (2006),
Di Bartolomeo et al. (2006) and van Aarle et al. (2002, 2004).
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shock in the pre-accession stage and in the post-accession stage. The differences between
both stages need to be completely attributed to the accession of theMUby a newmember.
In this way we can also directly calculate in the model the net benefits of
accession for each player.
The analysis is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a n-country dynamic
macroeconomic model that underlies the analysis in this paper. Section 3 analyzes
the policy coordination issues that arise in an MU. In particular, we focus on the
institutional setup and cooperative mechanisms in the MU. Section 4 introduces
main issues related to the enlargement of the MU. Numerical simulations in
Section 5 illustrate the functioning of the model using specific examples. The
conclusion summarizes the main insights.
2 The basic economic framework
Our analytical framework is presented in its most general form, from which various
specific settings can directly be chosen, e.g. by varying the number of countries and
MUs and types of policy cooperation. Assume that players from the set N interact.
They can be divided in two groups: nf countries f ( f ∈ F ) and nb central banks b (b ∈
B, with N=F ∪ B). Each bank is responsible for a monetary policy management in
one country or in a group of countries. More formally:
Definition 1 (Bank jurisdictional set) The set of all the countries for which a bank b
is liable is called a bank-b jurisdictional set (BJS) and is denoted by BJS(b). More
formally, BJS(b) := jb 2 N .
Clearly, each MU consists of the following set of players {BJS(b), b}. In
particular, if bank b is responsible for monetary policy management in only one
country, i.e.|BJS(b)|=1 or BJS(b)={jb}, we say that players from set {jb, b}
constitute a trivial MU. A non-trivial MU consists of the set of players {BJS(b), b}
such that |BJS(b)|Q2.
Considering the above definition, we describe each economy jb, i.e. each
economy j for which central bank b is liable, by an aggregate demand/IS curve
and an aggregate supply curve, which are a function of the domestic real interest
rate, the domestic real fiscal deficit, the foreign real outputs (i.e. real output gaps),
and the real exchange rates (measuring international competitiveness):









rjb‘y‘ tð Þ þ
X
‘2F=jb
djb‘ ejb tð Þ þ p‘ tð Þ  pjb tð Þ
  ð1Þ
in which y denotes the real output gap (defined as real output with respect to
potential real output), f the real fiscal deficit, p the price level, i the nominal interest
rate, and e the nominal exchange rate.
Real exchange rates are nominal exchange rates adjusted for relative prices and
they measure the international competitiveness of the economy. Nominal exchange
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rates are determined according to the uncovered interest-rate parity (UIP) hypothesis,
so that they adjust to corresponding interest-rate differentials:
ejb tð Þ ¼ ijb tð Þ  i‘b0 tð Þ; ejb 0ð Þ ¼ ejb0; ð2Þ
where the foreign currency of the nominal exchange rate is under the jurisdiction of
central bank b0 6¼ b and where ijb tð Þ is the nominal interest rate valid for country jb at
time t.7 The initial values of the exchange rates represent (initial) level shocks that
hit the relevant exchange rates at time zero, reflecting e.g. (initial) shocks in
international financial markets, etc. In an open-MU setting, the external exchange
rate of the MU with non-MU countries becomes a new shock absorber vis-á-vis the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Equations (3) are open-economy Phillips (or supply) curves:




e‘ tð Þ þ p‘ tð Þ
 
; pjb 0ð Þ ¼ pjb0: ð3Þ
The Phillips curve gives rise to a short-run relation between inflation and output (gap)
which results from the existence of some (nominal) rigidities in the goods and/or labor
markets. In the Phillips relationship (3) the inflation rates of the other countries play a
role reflecting the effects of “pass-through” of foreign inflation and depreciation of the
domestic currency on domestic prices. In accordance with our short-run stabilization
focus, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is limited to its transitory impact on output
through the induced stimulus of the aggregate demand. The initial values of domestic
prices represent (initial) level shocks that hit the economy at time zero. In this setting
both symmetric and asymmetric price shocks can be considered.
We assume that the fiscal authorities jb control their fiscal policy instrument such as
to minimize the following quadratic loss function, which features domestic inflation,
real output (gap), and the real fiscal deficit, with respect to the control variable fjb :







jb tð Þ þ bjb y2jb tð Þ þ #jb f 2jb tð Þ
n o
eq ttoð Þdt and ð4Þ
Central banks (CBs), which are responsible for monetary management in only one
country (i.e., are CBs of a trivial MU), feature the following form of loss function:







jb tð Þ þ bMjb y2jb tð Þ þ #Mjb i2jb tð Þ
n o
eq ttoð Þdt: ð5Þ
The loss function of a CB which is responsible for a monetary policy
management in an MU u ∈ U can be written as:













u tð Þ þ bMu Y
2




7 If there is only one non-trivial MU u (with k countries) involved in the model and if the currency of this
MU is the currency in which the exchange rates of the non-MU countries are expressed, we can simply
rewrite the UIP hypothesis (2) as: e

j tð Þ ¼ ij tð Þ  iU tð Þ, ej 0ð Þ ¼ ej0 j ¼ 1; 2; :::; n k þ 1ð Þ, where iU(t) is
the common nominal interest rate in the MU. u (if ėj (t) > 0 we have an appreciation of the currency of the
MU, while we have a depreciation of the MU currency in the opposite case (ėjb (t) < 0).
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where P








ju tð Þ and Yu tð Þ :¼
Pku
ju¼1 wjuyju tð Þ with ku being the number of
countries, that belong to MU u, i.e ku=|BJS(b)|, where b is a central bank of MU u,
and ωju is the weight of country j
u in the MU aggregate (e.g., its GDP share)
Theoretically speaking, any subset of the nf countries in the model could decide to
form an MU, there could be several MUs at the same time, there could exist none at
all or there could exist just one containing either a subset of countries or all the
countries, in which case we would have one world currency. For clarity, we
concentrate on the situation that there is only one MU, i.e., the set U contains only
one element.
As shown in Appendix B,8 the structural-form model (1)–(3) can be transformed









3775 ¼ D E MA B N






where y(t), p(t), and f (t) are the country-ordered vectors of real outputs, (output gaps),
prices, and real net- government expenditures, respectively, and e(t) and i(t) are the mixed





contains the elasticities of the price levels and control instruments
with respect to the real output gap and inflation. The upper part of matrix
L 2 R 2nfþnbð Þ 2nfþ2nbð Þindicates the instantaneous elasticities with respect to the
real output gaps. The lower part of the matrix indicates the elasticities with respect
to the price and exchange-rate dynamics of the model. Matrix L is crucial in the
analysis of the spillovers. More in detail, matrix E 2 R nfnfð Þ describes the effects of
the domestic fiscal policy on the domestic real output gaps (diagonal elements) and
those of the foreign fiscal policies on the domestic real output gaps (off-diagonal
elements), i.e. fiscal spillovers. Similarly, matrix B 2 R nfþnbð Þnf describes the effects
of fiscal policy on the price and exchange-rate dynamics. Matrices D 2 Rnf nfþnbð Þ
and A 2 R nfþnbð Þ nfþnbð Þ indicate the effects of price levels and exchange rates on
the domestic real output gaps and price and exchange-rate dynamics, respectively.
Matrices M 2 R nfnbð Þ and N 2 R nfþnbð Þnb are the semi-elasticities of the nominal
interest rates on real output gaps and price and exchange-rate dynamics, respectively.
3 General aspects of accession
The question arises what are the effects of the accession of additional countries to the
MU and under which conditions such an accession is beneficial for the acceding
countries and for existing members. The correct way to measure and evaluate
accession effects (on macroeconomic adjustment, policy formation and cooperation,
and the resulting welfare losses) is by comparing identical situations (in terms of
8 See www.ua.ac.be/joseph.plasmans.
9 The dimension of all vectors but i(t) and e(t) is nf . The dimension of the vectors i(t) and e(t) is equal to
the number of existing central banks nb.
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shocks, structures, and preferences) under two scenarios: (i) without accession (called
‘pre-accession’) and (ii) with accession (called ’post-accession’). The net effects can
then be attributed solely to the accession. Calculating welfare gains/losses and graphs
of the situation without and with enlargement immediately provides the accession
effects and this can be done, not only for the acceding countries, but also for the
countries that were already participating in the MU and for the countries that do not
accede at all.
We would expect that outsiders would like to accede if they are better off in the MU
than staying outside. Similarly, we could expect that current member states agree to an
MU enlargement if it makes them better off. Enlarging the MU when countries are
asymmetric is likely to make it more heterogeneous. To study this feature and assess its
consequences, we need -apart from a symmetric baseline for reference purposes- also
cases where the acceding countries are different from the existing members, e.g. in
shocks, structure, preferences, etc.
These important issues can be addressed in a relatively straightforward manner in
our approach. In our model, acceding the MU implies that for an accession country:
(i) there are no longer exchange rate adjustments possible vis-à-vis countries that
already participate in the MU; (ii) its monetary policy is now set by the common CB,
the monetary policy of which may not be optimal for the acceding country because
(a) it targets aggregate MU output and average inflation and (b) it may have different
preferences as reflected in the values of aMU , b
M
U , and #
M
U ; (iii) participating in the MU
could require that fiscal flexibility is stronger restrained because of the necessary
adoption of fiscal-stringency measures like the SGP; this would imply a higher value
of χj when country j enters the MU; (iv) participation changes the strategic settings
in the game and the possibilities for cooperation of policies for both acceding
countries and existing member states.
For the common CB, the accession of additional countries implies that: (i) there is
a redefinition of the aggregate target variables; this by itself may already induce
changes in optimal policymaking; (ii) its preferences may change if the acceding
countries have different preferences as reflected in the values of ! j, " j, and # j; this
will affect policymaking; (iii) the strategic configurations (coalition formation
process) in which the common CB operates have changed: the number of fiscal
players in the MU increases and the number of outside monetary and fiscal players
decreases. The adjustment dynamics from exchange-rate adjustment are changed.
For the (fiscal players of ) existing member countries, the accession implies: (i)
changes in the policy reactions of the acceding countries and the common CB because
of the reasons given above; (ii) the strategic configurations (coalition formation
process) in which they operate have changed: the number of other fiscal players in the
MU increases, while the number of outside monetary and fiscal players decreases.
Assuming that the economic structure is not affected by acceding the MU, we can
determine the welfare effects of accession for (i) the acceding countries, (ii) the
existing members by comparing losses under the no-accession scenario and the
accession scenario, assuming a similar shock scenario. Incentive compatibility of
accession would imply that both the acceding country and the existing member
countries would not lose from the accession.
Given all the effects listed above it is, therefore, even in our highly-stylized
model, by no means clear under which conditions the accession is likely to occur.
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The loss of exchange-rate and interest-rate flexibility is likely to entail negative costs
for the acceding country, as does the possible increase in fiscal conservatism
stemming from SGP-alike requirements. On the other hand, the change in the
institutional settings, as reflected in the enhanced strategic position and coalition
formation possibilities, may benefit the accession countries. The numerical analysis
in the next section will elaborate on these insights about the net effects of accession.
4 Numerical solutions of the model
4.1 General setup
Our analysis considers a setting of 5 countries. Country 3 aims to enter an existing
MU made of countries 1 and 2. At the pre-accession stage, there are 5 fiscal
authorities (denoted as C1, ..., C5) and 4 monetary authorities (denoted as CB, CB3,
CB4, CB5). At the post-accession stage the MU consists of C1, C2 and C3, CB3
ceases to exist and CB takes over the monetary policy management in C3.
Out of all possible coalition structures (CSs) πi, which represent different
cooperative arrangements between groups of players, we choose 37 CSs at the pre-
accession stage and 27 CSs at the post-accession stage. The first three CSs and the
last two of both pre- and post-accession stages are reported as they are interesting
reference points for comparison. In π1–π3, players C5 and CB5 play as singletons.
However, in all the other CSs, but π36 and π37, they play as a full national coalition
{C5, CB5}. Being in a coalition means that players are no more self-oriented but
maximize their joint welfare.
Often one can find a natural correspondence between certain CSs before and after
accession. The basic difference consists in taking over the activities of CB3 by the
CB of the MU upon accession (at the post-accession stage CB3 ceases to exist).
From now on, we will refer to the ith CS by πi, where i=1, ..., 64, Table 1.
We consider three different scenarios:
1. The benchmark scenario with a symmetric economic structure (sc1) - the MU
consists of two countries, C1 and C2, while there is (only) one accession
country, C3, one non-accession country, C4, and an additional country, C5. All
countries are assumed to be symmetric in the structural and preference
parameters and sizes. However, preferences of fiscal players are asymmetric
w.r.t. preferences of central banks. The following set of parameters underlies this
baseline case: gjb ¼ 0:2 ,hjb ¼ 0:75, rjb‘ ¼ 0:1, djb‘ ¼ 0:1, z jb ¼ 0:25, ς jb‘ ¼ 0:1,
ajb ¼ 0:2, bjb ¼ 0:4, #jb ¼ #MU ¼ #Mjb ¼ 0:4, aMU ¼ aMjb ¼ 0:4, bMU ¼ bMjb ¼ 0:2,
5jb ¼ 0:5; θ=0.10.10
10 This parameterization is based on various empirical studies for the euro area. They suggest that the
interest rate semi-elasticity of output (γi) lies in the range 0.1 to 0.3 (e.g. Angeloni et al. (2002) find a
value of 0.19) and the other spillovers originate from the instantaneous multiplier of fiscal policy (ηi) lying
between 0.5 and 1 (European Commission (2001) uses a value of 0.5 in its model), the competitiveness
effect (δij) and the elasticity w.r.t. the foreign output gap (ρij), which are somewhere around 0.1 and 0.3,
respectively (Hooper et al. (1998)). Considerable evidence also exists for the property that the output-gap
elasticity in the Phillips curve (ζi ) is relatively small (Smets (2000) estimates a value of 0.18) and that
there is some effect from foreign inflation rates (ςij) (Laxton et al. (1998)).
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Table 1 Pre- and post- accession coalition structures
Pre-accession coalition structures
π1 C1 C2 CB C3 CB3 C4 CB4 C5 CB5 π20 (C1,C2,C3) CB CB3 (C4,CB4)
(C5,CB5)
π2 (C1,C2) CB C3 CB3 C4 CB4 C5 CB5 π21 (C1,C3) C2 CB CB3 C4 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π3 (C1,C2,CB) C3 CB3 C4 CB4 C5 CB5 π22 (C1,C3) C2 CB CB3 (C4,CB4)
(C5,CB5)
π4 C1 C2 CB C3 CB3 C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π23 (C2,C3) C1 CB CB3 C4 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π5 C1 C2 CB (C3,CB3) C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π24 (C2,C3) C1 CB CB3 (C4,CB4)
(C5,CB5)
π6 C1 C2 CB C3 CB3 (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π25 (C1,C2,C4) CB C3 CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π7 C1 C2 CB (C3,CB3) (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π26 (C1,C2,C4) CB (C3,CB3) CB4
(C5,CB5)
π8 C1 C2 CB (C3,C4) CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5) π27 (C1,C4) C2 CB C3 CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π9 (C1,C2,CB) C3 CB3 C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π28 (C1,C4) C2 CB (C3,CB3) CB4 (C5,CB5)
π10 (C1,C2,CB) (C3,CB3) C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π29 (C2,C4) C1 CB C3 CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π11 (C1,C2,CB) C3 CB3 (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π30 (C2,C4) C1 CB (C3,CB3) CB4 (C5,CB5)
π12 (C1,C2,CB) (C3,CB3) (C4,CB4)
(C5,CB5)
π31 (C1,C2,C3,C4) CB CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π13 (C1,C2,CB) (C3,C4) CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5) π32 (C1,C4) (C2,C3) CB CB3 CB4
(C5,CB5)
π14 (C1,C2) CB C3 CB3 C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π33 (C1,C3,C4) C2 CB CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π15 (C1,C2) CB (C3,CB3) C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π34 (C2,C3,C4) C1 CB CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π16 (C1,C2) CB C3 CB3 (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π35 (C1,C3) (C2,C4) CB CB3 CB4
(C5,CB5)
π17 (C1,C2) CB (C3,CB3) (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π36 (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5) CB CB3 CB4 CB5
π18 (C1,C2) CB (C3,C4) CB3 CB4 (C5,CB5) π37 (C1,C2,CB,C3,CB3,C4,CB4,C5,CB5)
π19 (C1,C2,C3) CB CB3 C4 CB4 (C5,CB5)
Post-accession coalition structures
π38 C1 C2 C3 CB C4 CB4 C5 CB5 π52 (C1,C3) C2 CB (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5)
π39 (C1,C2) C3 CB C4 CB4 C5 CB5 π53 (C1,C4) C2 C3 CB CB4 (C5,CB5)
π40 (C1,C2,C3,CB) C4 CB4 C5 CB5 π54 C1 (C2 C4) C3 CB CB4 (C5, CB5)
π41 C1 C2 C3 CB C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π55 C1,C2 (C3, C4) CB CB4 (C5,CB5)
π42 C1 C2 C3 CB (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π56 (C1,C2) (C3, C4) CB CB4 (C5, CB5)
π43 (C1,C2,C3,CB) C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π57 (C1, C3) (C2, C4) CB CB4 (C5,CB5)
π44 (C1,C2,C3,CB) (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π58 (C1, C4) (C2, C3) CB CB4 (C5, CB5)
π45 (C1,C2,C3) CB C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π59 (C1, C2, C4) CB C3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π46 (C1,C2,C3) CB (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π60 (C1, C3, C4) CB C2 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π47 (C1,C2) C3 CB C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π61 (C2,C3, C4) CB C1 C3 CB4 (C5,CB5)
π48 (C1,C2) C3 CB (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π62 (C1, C2, C3, C4) CB CB4 (C5,CB5)
π49 C1 (C2,C3) CB C4 CB4 (C5,CB5) π63 (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) CB CB4 CB5
π50 C1 (C2,C3) CB (C4,CB4) (C5,CB5) π64 (C1, C2, C3, CB, C4, CB4, C5 CB5)
π51 (C1,C3) C2 CB C4 CB4 (C5,CB5)
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2. An asymmetric structural scenario (sc2) - in this example, we consider a
situation where the countries are marked by asymmetries in the economic
structure and in policy preferences. Simplifying, these asymmetries may be
interpreted in terms of the size of the country.11 In particular, we assume that,
compared with the symmetric baseline scenario:
(i) C1 is two times bigger than C2 and the accession country C3 and of an
equal size as C4 and C5. The detailed parameter values are reported in
Appendix A. Because C1 and C2 have a different size, CB1 is more
concerned with the economic performance in C1 than in C2, implying that
countries’ weights in CB1’s loss function are asymmetric: ω1=2/3, ω2=1/3
before accession and ω1=1/2, ω2=1/4, ω3=1/4 after accession.
(ii) C4 has a less conservative central bank, aM4 ¼ 0:2 and bM4 ¼ 0:4; hence,
coincide with the preferences of the fiscal authorities in C4.
3. An asymmetric structural scenario with asymmetric bargaining power (sc3),
where we add asymmetric bargaining power τ to the previous case. More
specifically, C1 is assumed to have a two times higher bargaining power than C2
and C3 in both pre- and post-accession stages and the same bargaining power as
C4, while C4 has a three times higher bargaining power than CB4. The exact
definition of τ is provided in Appendix C.12
Note that scenario sc3 is the most realistic one, since structural asymmetries are
accompanied by corresponding bargaining power asymmetries (so that a larger
country has a larger bargaining power).
Three different types of shocks are analyzed (shocks always occur at t=0 in the
form of initial innovations to the state variables): (i) a symmetric (negative) supply
shock: sP0S ¼ 0:01; 0:01; 0:01; 0:01; 0:01; 0; 0; 0; 0½ T , (ii) an asymmetric (negative)
supply shock that hits only C3: sP0A ¼ 0; 0; 0:01; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0½ T , and (iii) an
asymmetric exchange-rate shock that hits C5: sP0E ¼ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0:01½ T in
the pre-accession stage. In the post-accession stage, these shocks are defined as
sA0S ¼ 0:01; 0:01; 0:01; 0:01; 0:01; 0; 0; 0;½ T , (ii) sA0A ¼ 0; 0; 0:1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0½ T , and
(iii) sA0E ¼ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0:1½ T .
For clarity and in order to save space, we will characterize the pre- and post-









3 ). Below we will present optimal losses for symmetric scenario sc
P
1
under symmetric price shock scP0S for both pre- and post-accession stages. For
brevity, in the case of other shocks/scenarios we report optimal losses only for one
specific CS. The rest of the results is available on the internet.13
11 Both small and big countries can be either relatively open or relatively closed. A relatively closed but
big country may still affect other countries via direct spillover channels more than a relatively open but
small country. Hence, the interpretation of our direct spillover parameters rjb‘, djb‘, ς jb‘ is not
straightforward. They represent the mixed effects of size and openness. To have a clear interpretation
we may assume either that countries are of equal size and the value of a spillover parameter indicates
openness or that countries differ in size but are equally open. In the latter case the value of a spillover
parameter shows relative size of a country. In this paper we will follow this interpretation.
12 See www.ua.ac.be/joseph.plasmans.
13 See www.ua.ac.be/joseph.plasmans.
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4.2 Pre-accession stage, symmetric model
Table 5 in Appendix A reports (optimal) losses for a symmetric model in the pre-
accession stage under symmetric price shock s0S.
14 Note that while looking for the
social optimum CS(s), only CSs from π4 to π35 (in Table 5) and from π41 to π62 (in
Table 6 in Appendix A) are taken into account.
The consequences of a symmetric shock in the symmetric model in the pre-
accession stage are found in Table 5. The differences in (optimal) losses between the
different CSs are relatively small suggesting that policy coordination is of limited
importance in the case of symmetric shocks and in the presence of symmetric
countries. The differences between being inside or outside the MU are essentially
negligible in all regimes. It is worth analyzing the fully non-cooperative regime π1 in
Table 5. Losses of C1 and C2 differ from those of C3,C4 and C5, in spite of the fact
that all countries have symmetric economic structures and preference parameters.
The similar effect is visible also in losses of CBs and is caused by the asymmetry
in the interest rates. Simply, the insiders are subject to the common interest rate set
by the CB, while outsiders have their own national CBs. Moreover, notice that losses
of countries are in general much lower than losses of CBs. It can indicate both that
the magnitude of inflation caused by a shock is in general larger than the magnitude
of the output gap and/or that the interest rate instrument is more used than the fiscal
debt.15
4.3 Post-accession stage, symmetric model
Table 6 presents players’ losses at the post-accession stage for the symmetric
baseline scenario in the case of a symmetric shock. These results can be directly
compared to Table 5 for the pre-accession stage. Accession of C3 leads to only
marginal changes in the case of symmetric shocks. As before, differences between
CSs are small under symmetric shocks after accession, suggesting that in the case of
symmetric shocks accession has no substantial effects, neither for the accession
countries nor for the existing members.
4.4 Asymmetries in economic structures and shocks
For reasons of brevity we do not report all optimal losses for other cases.16 To give a
flavour of shock consequences, model and bargaining-power asymmetries we list in
Table 2 optimal losses for all the combinations of scenarios and shocks in two
regimes: π12=[C1C2CB|C3CB3|C4CB4|C5CB5] and π44=[C1C2C3CB|C4CB4|
14 For tables with losses for other shocks and/or asymmetries, see www.ua.ac.be/joseph.plasmans.
15 Note the perfect anti-symmetry between preferences of countries and central banks w.r.t. inflation and
output gap.
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C5CB5]. These two particular CSs were chosen because of two reasons. First, they
can be directly compared and second, they are characterized by a high degree of
players’ cooperation, which will show the effects of the bargaining power
asymmetries in scP3 and sc
A
3 .





Clearly, when an asymmetric price shock hits C3 outcomes are much different from
the symmetric shock case. The asymmetry of the shock makes C3 to be less
competitive; hence, this economy features by far highest losses and all the other
countries are influenced only via spillovers and externalities. The exchange rate
shock to C5 means that the currency of this country depreciates which raises its
competitiveness vis-à-vis the other economies.
At the same time it increases inflation in C5 and reduces inflation in the other
countries; this pass-through effect therefore will start to mitigate the initial
competitiveness effects. The effects are felt much stronger in C5 as the exchange
rate shock implies that it initially depreciates against all other countries, whereas
Table 2 Losses for CSs π12 and π44 in all combinations of scenarios and shocks

























C1 0.2480 0.1092 0.1081 0.2499 0.0511 0.1852 0.2483 0.0503 0.1823
C2 0.2480 0.1092 0.1081 0.2472 0.0374 0.1354 0.2492 0.0431 0.1559
CB 0.4921 0.1427 0.1375 0.4931 0.0631 0.2112 0.4934 0.0776 0.2589
C3 0.2481 2.4195 0.1287 0.2479 2.5014 0.1700 0.2481 2.4784 0.1848
CB3 0.4918 2.3501 0.1173 0.4929 2.6107 0.1734 0.4931 2.5531 0.2116
C4 0.2481 0.1301 0.1287 0.2463 0.0574 0.2078 0.2461 0.0353 0.1298
CB4 0.4918 0.1223 0.1173 0.2506 0.0602 0.2012 0.2506 0.1024 0.3478
C5 0.2481 0.1301 0.0053 0.2492 0.0592 0.9548 0.2495 0.0646 0.9077
CB5 0.4918 0.1223 0.6367 0.4927 0.0554 1.4787 0.4929 0.0675 1.3885
WIX 0.85% 0.00% 5.11% 0.94% 0.12% 4.75% 1.00% 0.00% 17.76%



















C1 0.2483 1.0731 0.1027 0.2509 0.8656 0.1759 0.2484 0.5756 0.1654
C2 0.2483 1.0731 0.1027 0.2475 0.7113 0.1239 0.2492 0.4753 0.1405
C3 0.2483 6.3947 0.1027 0.2475 6.5123 0.1239 0.2492 7.2718 0.1405
CB 0.4923 0.1355 0.1642 0.4944 0.1726 0.2559 0.4947 0.0688 0.3172
C4 0.2480 0.1255 0.1304 0.2463 0.0618 0.2109 0.2462 0.0348 0.1269
CB4 0.4922 0.0954 0.1323 0.2518 0.0350 0.2271 0.2519 0.1029 0.3923
C5 0.2480 0.1255 2.0028 0.2493 0.0627 1.9491 0.2496 0.0609 1.9021
CB5 0.4922 0.0954 1.5913 0.4940 0.0362 1.4295 0.4942 0.0722 1.3332
WIX 0.91% 0.00% 0.00% 1.11% 0.06% 0.00% 1.18% 0.03% 9.26%
CFI 0.61% 11.08% 40.83% 0.95% 20.88% 38.17% 1.01% 5.08% 60.30%
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from the perspective of the other countries, they only initially appreciate vis-à-vis
C5.
The effects from C3’s accession to the MU are found from a comparison of the
upper (pre-accession, scP ) and lower (post-accession, scA) parts of Table 2. In case of
the symmetric shock, the effects are rather small. The most striking are the effects of
an asymmetric price shock that hits C3. Before and after the accession losses of this
country are very high compared to losses of other players. Moreover, as pointed out in
previous tables, the costs incurred by C3 at the pre-accession stage is much lower than
those at the post-accession stage. It suggests that the study of a symmetric shock is a
good starting point but the real issue at stake are asymmetric shocks since their
influence is the highest. Hence, in our model lack of the exchange rate adjustment
(what also means sharing a common interest rate in an MU) is a big burden to the
economy hit by an asymmetric shock. We can, therefore, state that if the structure of
C3’s economy differs more from the economic structure of the existing MU countries
and there is a higher risk of an asymmetric shock, it becomes less likely that the MU
will be enlarged and it is in the interest of both current and prospective members of the
MU that the enlargement is postponed until a larger degree of economic convergence
is achieved. These findings are in line with conclusions of the OCA theory.
Comparing (scP=A2 ; s
P=A




0S ) we see the effects of the model
asymmetries in case of a symmetric shock. Differences are limited both in the pre-
and post accession cases. The large country C1 has higher losses than the smaller
country C2 whereas in the symmetric scenario losses were identical. C3 and C4 also
acquire lower losses than in the benchmark. The importance of model asymmetries









suggests. Similarly, the asymmetries have substantial consequences in








. Note also, that in
sc1 - with the exception of C3, CB3, C5 and CB5- the exchange rate shock leads to
rather similar effects as the asymmetric shock.17
4.5 Effects of accession
To get a better insight from the discussion of all scenarios we use some simple
statistical methods. It is interesting to see what are for a particular player the average
(optimal) losses over all CSs. More formally, the average value bJ i is defined as
follows. For ΠMU:={π4, π5, ..., π35} in the pre-accession stage bJi :¼ 132P35
s¼4
bJi psð Þ and
for ΠMU:={π41, π42, ..., π62} in the post-accession stage bJi :¼ 122 P62
s¼41
bJi psð Þ where bJi psð Þ
is an optimal loss of a player i in CS πs. We compute bJi for every player i=C1, C2,
..., CB5 in every shock/scenario combination in the pre-accession and post-accession
stage. These results are reported in Table 3.
Since Table 3 reports average (optimal) losses, similarly to Tables 5 and 6, it
shows at hand many characteristics of our model. However, now it aggregates






C1 and C2 and C3 and C4 are symmetric since economic spillovers and resulting
17 See Plasmans et al. (2006) for an adequate interpretation of the welfare index WIX and the coalition
formation index CFI in Table 2.
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economic externalities influence them symmetrically. Naturally, this symmetry
breaks up under the asymmetric shocks sP0S and s
P
0E and in the asymmetric scenarios
scP2 and sc
P
3 . The same holds in the post-accession stage.
In Table 3 we clearly see the differences caused by asymmetries of the model.






2 we see that structural asymmetries have
the larger impact on players’ losses than bargaining power asymmetries. This result
is not far from reality. The adjustment process after a shock is mainly driven by
economic spillovers since both monetary and fiscal authorities have only limited
influence on economic systems. When a shock occurs they can only partially control
economies. Hence, even an almost complete lack of bargaining power in any
coalition is not likely to increase losses substantially as, to a large extent, the
economic system returns to balance by itself.





can be also compared with losses obtained in the
non-cooperative regime π4 in scP1 (Table 5). This shows that on average all the fiscal
players lose from coordination compared to the non-cooperative regime. From this,
it could be argued, that if it is completely unclear which CS will be actually played
after the coordination process, then all the fiscal players would not enter to any
negotiations at all. They would prefer to play non-cooperatively since the expected
Table 3 Average value of losses in pre- and post-accession cases

























C1 0.2466 0.1694 0.1553 0.2479 0.0899 0.2660 0.2475 0.0830 0.2670
C2 0.2466 0.1694 0.1553 0.2471 0.0698 0.2124 0.2474 0.0704 0.2254
CB 0.4888 0.1121 0.0849 0.4893 0.0594 0.1351 0.4894 0.0562 0.1429
C3 0.2468 2.7953 0.1528 0.2474 2.9271 0.2099 0.2475 2.9306 0.2211
CB3 0.4885 2.3880 0.0828 0.4891 2.5570 0.1260 0.4891 2.5689 0.1287
C4 0.2468 0.1600 0.1528 0.2458 0.0640 0.2170 0.2456 0.0516 0.1937
CB4 0.4885 0.1097 0.0828 0.2453 0.0765 0.1629 0.2454 0.0782 0.2005
C5 0.2484 0.1272 2.0009 0.2494 0.0615 1.9389 0.2495 0.0605 1.9230



















C1 0.2464 0.9575 0.1591 0.2478 0.6197 0.2735 0.2474 0.5483 0.2746
C2 0.2464 0.9575 0.1591 0.2471 0.4900 0.2187 0.2473 0.4563 0.2316
C3 0.2464 6.8494 0.1591 0.2471 7.3495 0.2187 0.2473 7.4667 0.2316
CB 0.4893 0.1116 0.0827 0.4895 0.0729 0.1304 0.4896 0.0670 0.1368
C4 0.2466 0.1826 0.1522 0.2458 0.0921 0.2179 0.2456 0.0598 0.1947
CB4 0.4889 0.1188 0.0814 0.2453 0.0975 0.1588 0.2454 0.0872 0.1955
C5 0.2484 0.1267 2.0030 0.2495 0.0635 1.9408 0.2495 0.0596 1.9253
CB5 0.4876 0.1180 1.8015 0.4877 0.0711 1.6370 0.4878 0.0639 1.6150
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loss from coordination is higher. However, this argument does not hold for any other
combination of scenarios and shocks, i.e. expected loss from coordination for some
players is lower than the (optimal) loss in the non-cooperative regime. The
conclusion is that under these conditions players would support the existence of
some coordination mechanism as their expected loss from any form of cooperation is
lower than from a non-cooperative playing.18
To analyze effects of accession we will compute the difference between post- and
pre-accession losses for each player, i.e.: ΔUi ¼ bJ Að Þi  bJ Pð Þi . Hence, the upper part of
Table 4 is obtained by subtracting the upper part from the lower part of Table 3 after
deleting CB3.
Positive values in the upper part of Table 4 mean that for a particular player the
accession is not (on average!) profitable. Hence, it comes out that on average
accession is rather not profitable for the fiscal insiders under asymmetric shocks.
Only in the case of a symmetric shock for sc1 and sc3 they both gain on average. In
all combinations of scenarios and asymmetric shocks they lose. Moreover, note that
these average losses from enlargement are in general much higher than feasible
profits. The accession country C3 gains from entering the MU only in the case of a
symmetric shock, however, in all the three scenarios. The enlargement is on average
profitable for all three directly involved fiscal players together only in (sc1, s0S ) and
(sc3, s0S ). This suggests that actually, when structural/shock asymmetries are
present, it would be very difficult in our model to reach an agreement on an MU
enlargement, since, usually, such a decision should be taken unanimously.
Note that by far the highest increase in the average loss is faced by countries of
the enlarged MU in the case of an asymmetric price shock. This happens with no
exception for all 3 scenarios and certainly calls for further investigation. Therefore,
we compute for each player (except CB3) the difference between the minimal losses
in the post-accession stage (π42 to π59) and maximal losses in the pre-accession
stage (π4 to π35). More formally, we use the following formula to obtain the values
in the middle part of Table 4:
ΔbUi ¼ bJmin Að Þi  bJmax Pð ÞibJmax Pð Þi  100
where bJmin Að Þi ¼ minp4162 bJi and bJmax Pð Þi ¼ maxp435 bJi. Note that bJi is policymaker i’s
optimal loss in a particular coalition structure. ΔbUi is in percentages and is computed
for all three scenarios and shocks. All the negative numbers tell that there exists a
post-accession CS in which the loss for the particular player is lower than the
maximum of all losses that this player may incur in the pre-accession CSs. More
formally: bJ minðAÞi < bJ maxðPÞi . The result is ambiguous in these cases and requires
further investigation. The only conclusion that can be drawn, is the following: for
18 Of course, players can block an existence of a coordination mechanism hoping that they will (possibly)
coordinate informally in a subgroup and free ride, when other players will pursue non-cooperative
strategies. Such a situation is, in a way, contradictory to our assumption of perfect information, since due
to spillovers/externalities every form of cooperation would be immediately noticed by other players.
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these types of shocks and scenarios we cannot exclude the possibility that gains from
enlargement can be found when particular CSs before and after accession are
considered.
However, in the case of an asymmetric price shock that hits accession country C3,
in all three scenarios, all countries of the enlarged MU, have increased losses in
every possible coalition structure. So, always: bJminðAÞi > bJmaxðPÞi for i=C1,C2, C3.
The enlargement cannot be profitable for any of the fiscal players in the case of an
asymmetric price shock. Even, in the presence of a very effective coordination scheme,
there is no CS that could assure gains for C1, C2 and C3 after enlargement. This
confirms our conclusion, that when there is a high risk of an asymmetric price shock
in the accession country, the enlargement is unprofitable. Moreover, no coordination
mechanism can make it profitable. This result obtained here using a framework with
an extensive game- theoretic background is in line with results of the basic OCA
analysis which lacks any game-theoretic considerations.
The question arises what the effect of enlargement will be on the total loss of the
enlarged MU, defined as: JMU≡JC1+JC2+JC3+JCB. The last line of Table 4 presents the
percentage change in the average value of JMU with regard to the pre-accession stage.
JMU is positive in 6 cases, and negative in 3 cases. Moreover, increases of average
losses are in general much higher than decreases; hence, we may conclude that the
enlargement is rather not profitable also from the point of view of the MU joint welfare.
5 Conclusion
We find that the net effects of accession depend in particular on three factors: (i) the regime
of policy coordination in place before and after accession; (ii) the type of macroeconomic
shock and its degree of symmetry across countries; (iii) the degree of symmetry between
countries in economic structure, sizes of countries and their policy preferences.
The main insights from our analyses can be summarized as follows: (i)
Enlargement is likely to be unprofitable with increasing asymmetries in economic
structures and economic shocks. (ii) Our findings stress the importance of an
asymmetric shock. In our setting and in all the examples it emerges that if an
asymmetric price shock occurs in the accession country it is never profitable to
enlarge the MU. What is more, the differences in losses between the pre-accession
stage and the post-accession stage are so high that it will be difficult to design a
transfer system to compensate for a worse situation of some countries.
At the end some important limitations of our approach should be mentioned. First,
in solving linear-quadratic differential games we assume open-loop information
structure, i.e. all the control decisions are made at the beginning of the planning period
and cannot be changed thereafter. Second, we assume a complete lack of uncertainty.
Some further issues call for further research. For instance, different types of
shocks could be studied to further strengthen the obtained results. For example, it
seems interesting to evaluate the effects of an exchange rate shock that hits the MU
as a whole. If such a shock happens, is C3 better off in the pre-accession stage than
in the post-accession stage? If, in such a case, being in an MU is more profitable, the
issue of accession will be concerned with a trade-off between the vulnerability to
asymmetric price shocks and asymmetric exchange rate shocks.
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π38 π39 π40 π41 π42 π43 π44 π45 π46
C1 2.46207 2.46242 2.48564 2.46105 2.46458 2.48263 2.48274 2.46121 2.46501
C2 2.46207 2.46242 2.48564 2.46105 2.46458 2.48263 2.48274 2.46121 2.46501
C3 2.46207 2.46019 2.48564 2.46105 2.46458 2.48263 2.48274 2.46121 2.46501
CB 4.92613 4.91676 4.86414 4.90616 4.88974 4.88012 4.92311 4.88888 4.87945
C4 2.46204 2.46022 2.47501 2.45903 2.48298 2.49455 2.48020 2.45616 2.47925
CB4 4.92611 4.91890 4.88010 4.90533 4.86884 4.89142 4.92173 4.89206 4.86165
C5 2.46204 2.46022 2.47501 2.49004 2.48298 2.47728 2.48020 2.48423 2.47925
CB5 4.92611 4.91890 4.88010 4.88500 4.86884 4.88019 4.92173 4.87245 4.86165
WIX − − − 14.24% 10.91% 4.02% 0.00% 7.57% 4.56%
π47 π48 π49 π50 π51 π52 π53 π54 π55
C1 2.46134 2.46485 2.46001 2.46423 2.46134 2.46485 2.46178 2.46020 2.46020
C2 2.46134 2.46485 2.46134 2.46485 2.46001 2.46423 2.46020 2.46178 2.46020
C3 2.46001 2.46423 2.46134 2.46485 2.46134 2.46485 2.46020 2.46020 2.46178
CB 4.89956 4.88581 4.89956 4.88581 4.89956 4.88581 4.89998 4.89998 4.89998
C4 2.45792 2.48157 2.45792 2.48157 2.45792 2.48157 2.45865 2.45865 2.45865
CB4 4.90027 4.86610 4.90027 4.86610 4.90027 4.86610 4.89741 4.89741 4.89741
C5 2.48786 2.48157 2.48786 2.48157 2.48786 2.48157 2.48772 2.48772 2.48772
CB5 4.88021 4.86610 4.88021 4.86610 4.88021 4.86610 4.87990 4.87990 4.87990
WIX 11.29% 8.07% 11.29% 8.07% 11.29% 8.07% 10.54% 10.54% 10.54%
π56 π57 π58 π59 π60 π61 π62 π63 π64
C1 2.46050 2.46050 2.46076 2.46188 2.46188 2.45875 2.46147 2.46064 2.48331
C2 2.46050 2.46076 2.46050 2.46188 2.45875 2.46188 2.46147 2.46064 2.48331
C3 2.46076 2.46050 2.46050 2.45875 2.46188 2.46188 2.46147 2.46064 2.48331
CB 4.89403 4.89403 4.89403 4.88962 4.88962 4.88962 4.87771 4.87236 4.79249
C4 2.45757 2.45757 2.45757 2.45783 2.45783 2.45783 2.45660 2.45695 2.48102
CB4 4.89298 4.89298 4.89298 4.88715 4.88715 4.88715 4.87647 4.87132 4.78536
C5 2.48573 2.48573 2.48573 2.48401 2.48401 2.48401 2.47968 2.45695 2.48102
CB5 4.87562 4.87562 4.87562 4.87194 4.87194 4.87194 4.86300 4.87132 4.78536
WIX 7.78% 7.78% 7.78% 6.23% 6.23% 6.23% 2.54% − −
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In scP=A2 we assume the following parameter values for the matrices ρ, ς , δ defined in
Appendix B:19
r :¼ ς :¼
0 1=15 1=15 2=15 2=15
4=35 0 2=35 4=35 4=35
4=35 2=35 0 4=35 4=35
2=15 1=15 1=15 0 2=15




4=10 1=15 1=15 2=15 2=15
4=35 4=10 2=35 4=35 4=35
4=35 2=35 4=10 4=35 4=35
2=15 1=15 1=15 4=10 2=15
2=15 1=15 1=15 2=15 4=10
26666664
37777775
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
van Aarle B, Di Bartolomeo G, Engwerda J, Plasmans J (2002), “Coalitions and dynamic interactions
between fiscal and monetary authorities in the EMU”. Ifo Studien 48(2):207–229
van Aarle B, Di Bartolomeo G, Engwerda J, Plasmans J (2004) “Policy- makers’ Coalitions and
Stabilization Policies in the EMU”. JEcon 82(1):1–24
Angeloni, I., A. Kashyap, B. Mojon and D. Terlizzese (2002), “Monetary transmission in the Euro-area:
Where do we stand?”, ECB Working Paper No. 114, Frankfurt.
Di Bartolomeo G, Engwerda J, Plasmans J, van Aarle B (2006), “Staying together or breaking apart:
Policy-makers’ endogenous coalitions formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union”,
Computers and Operations Research, 33:438-463.
Bohn F (2004) Monetary Union and the Interest-Exchange Rate Trade-off. Open econ 15:111–141
Boone L, and Maurel M (1999), “Economic convergence of the CEECs with the EU”, CEPR Discussion
Paper no.2018.
Engwerda J, van Aarle B, Plasmans J (1999) The (in) finite horizon open- loop Nash LQ game: An
application to the EMU. Ann Oper Res 88:251–273
Engwerda J, van Aarle B, Plasmans J (2002) Cooperative and non- cooperative fiscal stabilisation policies
in the EMU. J. econ. dyn. control 26:451–481
European Commission (2001), “Public finances in EMU — 2001”, European Economy Reports and
Studies, No. 3, Brussels.
European Parliament (1999), “EMU and enlargement: A review of policy issues”, Working Paper 12/99
Directorate-General for Research.
Favero C, Freixas X, Persson T, Wyplosz C (2000) One money many countries, monitoring the European
Central Bank 2. Center for Economic Policy Research, London
Fidrmuc J, and Korhonen I (2001), “Similarity of supply and demand shocks between the euro area and
the CEECs”, BOFIT Discussion Paper 2001/14.
von Hagen J, Lutz S (1996) Fiscal and Monetary Policies on the Way to EMU. Open econ. rev. 7:299–325
19 The off-diagonal elements of these matrices are the direct spillovers. For Appendix B, see www.ua.ac.
be/joseph.plasmans.
Analysis of a monetary union enlargement 155
Hooper, P., K. Johnson and J. Marquez (1998), “Trade elasticities for G-7 countries”, International Finance
Discussion Paper No. 609, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington DC.
Hughes Hallett, A.J. and P. McAdam (1997), "Fiscal Deficit Reductions in Line With the Maastricht
Criteria for Monetary Union: An Empirical Analysis" in J. Frieder, D. Gros, E. Jones (eds.), Towards
European Monetary Union: Problems and Prospects, Cambridge University Press.
Laxton, D., P. Isard, H. Faruqee, E. Prasad and B. Turtleboom (1998), “MULTI- MOD Mark III — The
Core Dynamic and Steady-State Models”, IMF Occasional Paper No. 164, Washington DC.
Michalak, T., J. Plasmans and J. Engwerda (2006), "Models of endogenous coalition formation between
fiscal and monetary authorities in the presence of a monetary union", Working Paper, University of
Antwerp, 39 pages.
Plasmans, J., J. Engwerda, B. van Aarle, and G. Di Bartolomeo (2006), Dynamic Modelling of Monetary
and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 319 pages.
Smets, F. (2000), “What horizon for price stability”, ECB Working Paper No. 24, Frankfurt.
156 J. Plasmans et al.
